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1. Courts continue to struggle world-wide with the issue of whether 
journalists should have immunity or privileges preventing them from being 
compelled to disclose confidential sources. There have been few 
subpoenas issued to journalists over the years in New Zealand but none 
have resulted in imprisonment. It is apparent police have been reluctant 
to involve journalists in criminal proceedings and where they have been, 
courts have worked hard to find pragmatic solutions.  
2. Today I can at last discuss a New Zealand High Court decision made some 
time ago and compare it to a European decision about an English case. The 
NZ decision was actually made late in 2009 but the reason I have had to 
wait to discuss it is because it arose in the context of the trial process 
for the notorious medal thieves. They have now both been sentenced for 
the offence and so this aspect of the process can now be discussed.  
3. No doubt most people recall that early in 2008, an interview with the 
alleged war medal thief by New Zealand broadcaster John Campbell was 
broadcast on Campbell Live. Introducing the interview, Mr Campbell 
assured viewers that nothing had been done to reveal the man's identity 
and that no payment of any sort had been offered. The man was referred 
to by a pseudonym. The interview which followed was just under five 
minutes in length, with the interviewee appearing as a silhouette of a 
hooded figure. After the interview, viewers were advised that an actor's 
voice had been used, but no changes had been made to what was actually 
said in interview.  
4. The interview had actually taken place earlier in the day in a hotel, where 
the alleged thief had been recorded on audio only. In fact, an actor was 
used to broadcast the interview that evening, using a transcript of the 
real interview.  
5. The police were able to make arrests in the case and then applied for an 
order under s 68 of the Evidence Act 2006 compelling John Campbell and 
five of his production team to produce relevant information at 
depositions and at trial relating to the alleged burglary. Mr Campbell 
refused to disclose the identity of the man throughout. This was the 
first time this provision containing a new presumption of non-compulsion 
for journalists where disclosure of sources is at risk has been tested. 
Despite the presumption, journalists do remain ultimately compellable 
where a judge finds there is greater public interest in disclosure. 
6. Justice Randerson in the High Court dealt with the matter extremely 
sensitively in an interim judgment and reached a final decision three 
weeks later having heard further from counsel in the case. The Court 
heard arguments from the media as to the possible chilling effects on 
media sources if there was doubt about the ability of media to protect 
those sources. Mr Campbell was convinced he could not have got the story 
without giving an undertaking not to disclose, and did so relying on his 
understanding of the new statutory immunity, which he nonetheless 
recognised was not absolute but only to be overridden in very limited 
circumstances.  
7. Further evidence was put forward by Gavin Ellis to the effect that 
journalists should not give guarantees of confidentiality lightly and must 
be satisfied the source has relevant, direct knowledge of a matter of 
sufficient public interest, where the information cannot be obtained any 
other way.  Having done so, however, such guarantees are to be honoured 
whether the journalist is acting in a ‘watchdog’ role in relation to state 
activities or merely serving the public in the dissemination of information 
of general public interest. Mr Ellis suggested that only two circumstances 
could justify the breaking of a guarantee of confidence – where harm to 
personal health or safety would otherwise result or a serious crime would 
be committed, or where the journalist becomes aware of ulterior motives 
which would have justified refusal of the guarantee. 
8. The police in response put forward evidence from journalist and lawyer 
Steven Price which questioned the assumption that a chilling effect would 
automatically follow from an order compelling Mr Campbell to disclose, 
and also questioned the ability of any party to measure the extent of any 
such effect. Further, Mr Price suggested that most ordinary, off-the-
record conversations with sources would not be chilled, and that most 
informants would probably assess any risk of disclosure against the 
similarities between their situation and other cases where disclosure had 
been made.  This evidence was accepted by the judge as demonstrating 
that arguments about a chilling effect have not been tested empirically 
and are therefore predictive rather than conclusive.  
9. The Court then examined the history of such protection in New Zealand. 
In particular, the previous legislation contained a clause allowing a court 
to excuse witnesses after balancing the public interests involved. The 
power to excuse was an exception to a presumption of compulsion which 
the new Evidence Act has reversed.  Previous cases dealing with that 
provision had recognised, however, that the public interest in the media’s 
role should not be discounted lightly.  
10. Randerson J also examined English law, where greater protection is now 
provided under the Contempt of Court Act than existed before, though 
the ultimate power of compulsion similarly still remains. However, the 
judge did not discuss a recent decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Financial Times Ltd v the United Kingdom which came after 
Campbell and examined the English provision in the light of European law.  
11. Financial Times was an application by media alleging that an order made by 
the High Court as long ago as 2001 to deliver up certain documents to a 
Belgian brewing company, Interbrew, was in breach of the right to the 
freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention). 
The documents did not contain direct evidence but might have disclosed 
the source of some leaked and possibly inaccurate information about the 
company.  
12. The European Court found that orders to disclose sources interfere with 
freedom of expression and therefore to survive, an order must have a 
legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. This is most 
likely to be satisfied where an order is sought to prevent crime, but is 
more difficult to justify where you have private parties in a breach of 
confidence setting.  
13. The European Court scrutinises restrictions on confidentiality of 
journalistic sources very closely.  The Court referred to an earlier 
decision in a case called Goodwin involving private parties and confidential 
information, where an order to disclose was not upheld. In the end, 
Interbrew’s interests in preventing future damage arising from possible 
publication of confidential information by identifying and pursuing the 
unknown confidence breaker and seeking damages for past breaches, 
were insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the protection of 
journalist’s sources. The Financial Times decision suggests that while 
there is no need for an absolutist position to be taken to freedom of 
expression, the starting point should always be a presumption that 
disclosure of sources is contrary to the public interest, and requires 
something exceptional to displace it. 
14. To return to New Zealand, in Campbell, Justice Randerson confirmed that 
the starting point here is no obligation on journalists to disclose, but with 
potential for that immunity to be displaced. The party seeking 
displacement must make the case. Justice Randerson thought the New 
Zealand provision is different from the United Kingdom requirements. He 
saw our provision as clearly requiring balancing, which is an evaluative 
judgment made up of fact and degree. So Justice Randerson would not 
state a threshold similar to that in Goodwin and Financial Times. 
Protection is not to be overridden easily in New Zealand, but no high 
threshold is assumed, such as requiring truly exceptional or compelling 
circumstances. However, he did emphasise that freedom of expression is 
to be given substantial weight both in a narrow sense relating to 
protecting sources, and a broad sense. Hence, the presumptive right to 
protection is not to be displaced lightly and only after careful weighing. 
15. A number of issues will be relevant in the weighing exercise. These are 
whether other means are available to obtain the information, the status 
of the evidence in the prosecution case, the nature of the charge, 
adverse effects arising from disclosure on the informant or others, and 
chilling effects arguments. 
16. After considering the facts in Campbell in detail, the judge indicated his 
inclination to make an order for disclosure. However, he asked counsel to 
consider the matter further and return to him with further submissions. 
About three weeks later, he dismissed the application after Mr Campbell 
produced a ‘will say’ statement with some information in it. The judge 
treated this as voluntary disclosure of material which could otherwise be 
protected under the statute. This meant that a disclosure order was no 
longer necessary and the order was dismissed on the understanding that 
Mr Campbell would provide a statement to police on the basis of his will-
say statement to the Court. 
17. I think the decision illustrates that although there is now a presumption 
in favour of media contained in the New Zealand statutory provision, the 
courts are still inclined to carry out a fact specific weighing exercise 
when applying it. This seems akin to the approach still taken by the 
domestic courts in the United Kingdom and frowned on by the European 
court.  
18. I think that if the New Zealand Bill of Rights had been applied more 
closely to the new provision, the presumption in the section in favour of 
non-disclosure would have carried more weight and would be displaced 
only in exceptional circumstances, as suggested in Financial Times. Would 
this have resulted in a decision closer to that in Financial Times? Perhaps 
not. This is because Campbell involved an application to compel the 
journalist in order to facilitate a prosecution for a serious criminal 
offence, in contrast to both Goodwin and Financial Times, which involved 
private claims for breach of confidence. So ultimately, disclosure in 
Campbell might well have been justified overall. 
19. New Zealand courts do their best to assist media to protect their 
sources but still reserve the right to exercise compulsion at the end of 
the day. While I see nothing wrong in maintaining a pragmatic approach to 
the issue and a healthy scepticism about the abstract predictions of any 
chilling effect, I would prefer the presumption against disclosure in the 
Evidence Act to operate as a true presumption rather than a more open-
ended discretion as suggested in the Campbell case. 
